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Abstract: Exploring the governance modes of private listed enterprises, this paper divides private
listed enterprises into categories of small, medium and large. The governance modes of private listed
enterprises can be divided into 9 categories according to two different management intensities of
equity capital governance and manpower capital governance. The 9 categories of governance modes of
private listed enterprises are identified by using the BP neural network mode. This paper analyses the
evolution of private listed companies’ governance modes at different scales and analyses various
governance modes. Therefore, small, medium and large private listed companies choose the ‘strong
equity and weak manpower’, ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ and ‘weak equity and
moderate manpower’ governance modes, respectively. This paper comparatively analyses the
governance efficiency of governance modes at different scales. The results show that ‘moderate equity
and moderate manpower’ is the most effective management mode for all three scales.
Key words：Growth period；Private listed enterprises；BP neural network；Governance model
recognition
1. Introduction
General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that ‘private economy is an indispensable force to promote
China’s development’ at a ‘private enterprises forum’ held on the first of November 2018, which
demonstrates the importance of private economy to China’s economic development. The development
of the private economy is closely related to the governance mode of private enterprises, and private
listed companies, as the best among private enterprises, play a leading and exemplary role.
Strengthening the research on the governance mode of private listed companies is of great significance
for promoting the high-quality development of the private economy and is undoubtedly a popular topic
at present. In small private listed companies, the actual controller (or family) maintains a strong desire
for control. Ownership and control rights are relatively concentrated in entrepreneurs or families,
dominated by the equity capital governance mode. For the development and growth of enterprises,
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equity diversification and management professionalization become inevitable, and the governance
mode of private listed companies gradually changes from a governance mode dominated by equity
capital to a collaborative governance mode of human capital and equity capital.
At present, research results on private enterprise governance are abundant and are mainly
concentrated on three levels. In terms of governance mechanisms, Jensen and Ruback proposed that
the shareholding ratio of the chairman of the board of supervisors in private enterprises has a negative
promoting effect on corporate governance efficiency[1]. According to Claessens and Yurtoglu, the
establishment of an effective corporate governance mechanism by private listed companies can better
cope with the changing requirements of the institutional environment and economic environment in
enterprise development[2]. Wu Lidong et al. proposed that the improvement of corporate governance
mechanisms plays a key role in the transition of private enterprises from family governance to
professional operation[3]. In terms of governance structure, Nohria and Ghoshal proposed that
adjustment of the board of directors and related governance structure is conducive to supervision and
incentive of management[4]. Jiang et al.

proposed that excessive concentration of governance

structure leads to higher agency costs[5]. Bacon stated that when the size of the board of directors is too
large, it is likely to lead to disagreement, thus leading to failure of governance [6]. Jensen also believed
that a board size that is too large easily leads to governance failure[7]. In terms of governance mode,
Zhou Xiuyun and Feng Junwen stated that China’s private listed companies have formed unique
governance modes during the period of development, including the family-oriented governance mode
and social legal person-oriented governance mode[8]. Huang Sujian et al. proposed that the governance
arrangement of private enterprises follows the path evolution of ‘entrepreneur enterprises-family
enterprises-family-like enterprises-professional managers’ enterprises’[9]. Xiao Chengmin proposed
that the choice of the best governance structure of private enterprises is determined by the institutional
environment[10]. He Jun stated that public policy of private enterprise governance cannot directly
interfere with the choice of private enterprise governance mode, and more consideration should be
given to influencing entrepreneurs’ governance choice from the perspective of improving the external
environment[11]. Zhang Min and Zhang Yili

proposed that perfect contractual governance can reduce

the cost of maintaining interpersonal relationships in a study of private enterprises in Wenzhou
Province[12]. Chen Weizheng et al. stated that the governance mode of private enterprises has the
dominant tendency of equity capital governance[13]. Chen Xin and Shen Leping proposed that most
private enterprises in China have a family style

[14]

. Tian Yinhua et al. stated that 75% of private

enterprises in China have family organization or family management [15]. Therefore, a large number of
scholars have explored family business governance. For example, Gomez-Mejia et al. stated that weak
relational contract governance is conducive to improving enterprise performance and avoiding
business risks[16]. Baker et al. proposed that an unclear definition of agents’ work resulted in the
existence of relational contracts[17]. Chen Jianlin proposed that the governance mode of family
enterprises should be selected according to the actual situation: family governance, professional
International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-8, Iss-3
50

governance, eclectic governance and colonial governance[18]. Zhou Zhiqiang et al. concluded that
strong explicit contract governance and strong implicit contract governance are the most effective
governance modes for Chinese family enterprises[19]. Liu Lin and Deng Jianming showed that with
the development of family businesses, the mode of ‘strong contract-strong relationship governance’
should be chosen[20].
In summary, scholars have conducted fruitful research on private enterprises’ governance modes,
laying a good foundation for this paper, but there are still some deficiencies. First, the evolution path
of the governance mode of private enterprises has been studied, but which governance mode is the
most effective is seldom noted. Second, human capital governance is not combined well with equity
capital governance. The participation of human capital in governance is inevitable. It is difficult to
analyse private enterprise governance practices effectively only from the perspective of equity capital
to investigate corporate governance issues. Third, linear modes are usually used to conduct empirical
research on private enterprise governance modes, which fails to reflect the nonlinear relationship in
private enterprise governance and fails to accurately explain its efficiency. In view of this, this paper
divides the governance modes of private listed companies into 9 categories from the two dimensions
of equity capital and human capital governance according to their different strengths. In addition, the
BP neural network mode is used for nonlinear empirical testing. The research conclusions are more
reliable and can provide a reliable basis for the selection of governance modes of private listed
companies.
The possible research contributions of this paper are as follows: First, from the perspective of the
combination of human capital and equity capital, the governance mode of private enterprises is
distinguished, and this distinction of the governance mode of private enterprises is more scientific.
Second, using the BP neural network to identify the governance mode of private enterprises can
effectively reflect nonlinear relationships, the identification effect is better, and the conclusions are
more accurate. Third, the key purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical basis for private
enterprises to choose the optimal governance mode. Therefore, based on the effective identification of
governance modes, the evolution of governance modes of private enterprises in different scales are
analysed, and the analyses of their management efficiency are classified to provide a basis for the
selection of the optimal governance modes of private enterprises.
2. Research Design
2.1. Research methods
In this paper, a BP neural network mode is built based on the multi-layer forward feedback
algorithm of error backpropagation that is used to identify the governance pattern of private listed
companies. Evolution analysis is carried out on the private listed company governance mode. Private
listed companies can be divided into categories of small, medium and large. This paper classifies and
analyses various governance modes of small, medium and large private listed companies and
determines the selection trend of governance modes of private listed companies. Additionally, the
governance efficiency of private listed companies’ governance modes are compared and analysed at
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different scales, and the most effective governance mode of private listed companies is determined.
2.2. Research tools
This paper uses the BP neural network mode to explore the governance mode of private listed
companies. A BP neural network can effectively simulate the mode of thinking of the human brain and
has autonomous learning characteristics.
A BP neural network consists of an input layer, hidden layer and output layer (as shown in figure
1). In figure 1,

represent the initial input values of each neuron node. If the

weight between neuron nodes in each layer is

formula

, the neuron threshold for i is

. According to the

, the net input value of the i neuron node can be obtained. If the

number of input layer nodes of the BP neural network mode is n, the number of hidden layer nodes is
m, the node number of the output layer is t, the weight of the input layer and hidden layer is
weight of the hidden layer and output layer is
the transfer function of output layer is

, the transfer function of the hidden layer is

, the
,

, the output value of the hidden layer node

, and the output value of the output layer node

can

be obtained.
Data flow

input layer

hide layer

output layer

Error propagation

Fig 1. BP neural network topology
The BP neural network can adjust the weights between each layer through the reverse
propagation error to achieve the optimal effect of the global error. This process includes the forward
flow of data and reverse propagation of error, which are generated by the finite iterations of dynamic
superposition of the two. The positive flow path of the data is input layer→hidden layer →output layer,
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and the neurons in each layer only affect the state of neurons in the next adjacent layer.
If expected results cannot be obtained from the forward flow of data, the weight of each layer is
adjusted by backward propagation error. For example, the expected output of sample t is
actual output of sample t is

, while the

. According to the sum of squares error function, we can determine a

single sample error

and then the global error

.

In the comparison of the global error with the critical value of error, if the global error is larger
than the critical value of error, the weight is adjusted in reverse. The weight change of the input layer
and hidden layer is

. The weight change of the hidden layer and

output layer is

.

is the learning rate. To obtain the optimum global error, the

finite weight should be adjusted. When the optimal global error is smaller than the critical value of
error, the BP neural network mode is established.
2.3. Model design
On the basis of fully understanding the basic principles of the BP neural network and combined
with the actual situation of private listed companies’ governance, the BP neural network mode of
private listed companies’ governance is constructed, as shown in figure 2. Figure 2 shows the training
and learning process of the BP neural network mode of private listed companies’ governance. First, we
normalize the initial data and randomly assign the weights of each layer and the threshold value of
each neuron node. Second, we determine the sample input vector and the expected result and calculate
the simulation result of the sample. Third, according to the difference and error critical value
comparison between the expected result and simulation result, the weight between each layer is
adjusted in the reverse direction. Fourth, we repeat the second step until the error between the
simulation and expected result is smaller than the error critical value; then, the BP neural network
mode learning and training are completed, and the mode establishment is completed.

Evaluation result processing

Initial data input

Data normalization processing

Governance model evaluation index sample data

BP neural network

input layer hide layer

output layer
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Fig 2. BP neural network model of private listed companies’ governance
Weight is the key factor that affects whether the BP neural network mode can be identified
accurately or not, and the determination of weight is closely related to the input vector. To determine
the weight between each layer, this paper sets up a private listed company governance indicator system,
as shown in table 1.
Tab 1. Index system of private listed companies’ governance
1.The actual controller owns the ownership ratio of listed
company
Private listed corporate governance indicators

Equity capital
management indicators

2.The actual controller owns the control right ratio of listed
company
3.The actual controller holds the president position and general
manager
4.Shareholding ratio of chairman
5.The proportion of company directors holding shares in the total
number of directors (excluding independent directors)
1.Shareholding ratio of senior executives

Human capital
management index

2.The proportion of total compensation of top three executives in
operating income
3.The proportion of independent directors in the board of directors
4.Number of board meetings
5.The situation of non-actual controller as chairman and general
manager

As shown in table 1, the governance indicators of private listed companies are divided into equity
capital and human capital governance indicators. Equity capital governance mainly reflects the actual
controller (or founder and family) control of enterprises. Human capital governance mainly reflects the
status and role of executives, external directors and other non-actual controllers in corporate
governance. Among them, equity capital management and manpower capital management include five
secondary indicators. Equity capital governance indicators of the first, second and third indicators
reflect equity capital management from the perspective of actual controllers. The higher the proportion
of ownership and control of the company by the actual controller is, the more concentrated the equity.
The actual controller holds the post of chairman of the board and general manager concurrently, which
means that the more centralized the power is, the stronger the intensity of equity capital management.
The fourth and fifth indicators reflect equity capital governance from the perspective of directors. The
higher the shareholding ratio of chairpersons is, the lower the proportion of the total number of
directors holding the company’s shares on the board of directors (excluding independent directors),
which indicates that the more enterprises tend to control equities and control rights, the stronger the
equity capital governance. In the first and second indicators of human capital governance, the higher
the proportion of senior executives’ shareholding is, the higher the proportion of the total
compensation of the top three executives in the operating income, which indicates that the more the
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attention paid to talent, the stronger the human capital governance intensity. The third indicator
reflects that the higher the proportion of the number of independent directors on the board of directors
is, the more enterprises attach importance to external talents and the stronger the governance intensity
of human capital. The fourth indicator reflects that the more board meetings that are held, the more
attention paid to the role of human capital in corporate decision-making and the stronger the
governance intensity of human capital. The fifth indicator shows that when the non-actual controller
holds the post of chairman or general manager or holds the posts concurrently, this indicates that the
enterprise dares to use human capital and the governance intensity of human capital is stronger.
The BP neural network can adjust weights by reverse-propagating errors. Therefore, this paper
uses the average number of indicators to assign the weight value of each layer, that is, each indicator is
given the same weight.
To establish the BP neural network mode to accurately identify the governance mode of private
listed companies, this paper divides the governance mode from the two dimensions of equity capital
governance and human capital governance. The equity capital governance intensity is divided from
low to high into weak, moderate, and strong. The manpower capital management intensity is divided
from low to high into weak, moderate, and strong. The equity capital governance intensity is taken as
the horizontal coordinate and the human capital governance intensity is taken as the vertical coordinate
to construct the grid mode, as shown in figure 3. Through the arrangement and combination of the
governance intensity of equity capital and human capital, 9 governance modes are obtained.

Human capital management intensity

Weak equity

Medium equity

Strong equity

and strong

and strong

and strong

manpower

manpower

manpower

Weak equity

Medium equity Strong equity
and medium and medium
and medium
manpower

manpower

Weak equity

Medium equity Strong equity

and weak

and weak

and weak

manpower

manpower

manpower

manpower

Equity capital governance intensity

Fig 3. Governance grid model of private listed companies
3. Identification of private listed companies’ governance pattern
Based on the establishment of the BP neural network mode, a BP neural network mode that can
effectively identify private listed companies’ governance mode is established through data acquisition
and preprocessing, learning, training and testing and verification.
3.1. Data acquisition and preprocessing
There are two sources of data. The main data are obtained from private listed companies in the
CSMAR database and executive shareholding ratio data of private listed companies from the RESSET
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database. The data from 2017 are all used to obtain 2366 samples, 409 of which are missing, and 1957
of which are valid. Based on the actual situation, according to the two dimensions of the total number
of employees and assets, based on the ‘Statistics for the Classification of Large, Medium, Small and
Micro Enterprises (2017)’, private listed companies are divided into small, medium and large to ensure
that the other factors remain the same and improve the accuracy of the mode simulation, and 150 small,
150 medium, and 150 large private listed companies are randomly selected from the 1957 valid
samples. A total of 450 samples construct the experiment set.
The average (M) and standard deviation (s) of each indicator are calculated by MATLAB 2014a
programming. The program can divide all the data into three intervals with M+s and M-s as cut-off
points and assign the value located at [M+s, max] to 3. The value located at [M-s, M+s] is 2. The value
located at [min, M-s] is 1. The ratio of the number of directors holding shares of the company to the
total number of directors of the board of directors (excluding independent directors) is inversely
assigned. For the index of concurrent posts, the value of concurrent posts is 3; otherwise, the value is 1.
By adding the scores of each index, we can obtain the governance scores of equity capital and human
capital, divide the governance intensity of equity capital and human capital into three categories of
weak, moderate and strong, and then obtain the governance mode of 450 private listed companies.
Before using the BP neural network mode to identify the governance patterns of 450 private listed
companies, the data should be normalized. To improve the learning effect and convergence speed of
the mode, this paper normalizes the data to a range of 0-1 during preprocessing. The specific formula
is as follows:
, where j= 1,2,3... 450，

is the initial value of the i index, and

is

the value obtained by normalization of the i index.
3.2. Determination of BP neural network structure
This paper uses a three-layer BP neural network mode with one input layer, one hidden layer and
one output layer. Among them, the number of nodes in the input layer is equal to the input vector
dimension, and the number of nodes in the output layer is equal to the output vector dimension. The
number of secondary indicators in the private listed companies’ governance indicators is 10, and the
number of input layer nodes is 10. The private enterprise governance mode is divided into 9 categories.
From

, it can be seen that the number of nodes in the output layer is 4. There is no

uniform regulation of the number of nodes in the hidden layer in academic circles. According to the
empirical formula,

, where

number of nodes in the input layer,

is the number of nodes in the hidden layer,

is the

is the number of nodes in the output layer, and the

Levenberg-Marquard algorithm is combined to realize the optimal training effect. The number of
nodes in the hidden layer is 7. Therefore, the topology of the BP neural network mode is established,
which is 10-7-4.
3.3. Learning and training of BP neural network
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In the mode, the tan-sigmoid function is used as the activation function of the hidden layer, and
the log-sigmoid function is used as the activation function of the output layer. In the experiment, 145
small, 145 medium and 145 large private listed companies are selected by stratified sampling to form
the training set with a total of 435 samples. The BP neural network is trained many times with training
set samples, and that with small global error is reserved for the test of remaining samples. Among
them, the BP neural network mode with the number of nodes in the hidden layer of 7 is trained 24
times, and the global error is

, as shown in figure 4.
Best Training Performance is 0.00014899 at epoch 24
0

Mean Squared Error (mse)

10

-1

10

-2

10

-3

10
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0
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10

15

20
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Fig 4. Training results of 7 nodes in the hidden layer
3.4. BP neural network test and verification
The purpose of establishing the BP neural network mode is to effectively identify all private
listed companies’ governance modes. Therefore, the mode must have a strong normalization ability. To
test its normalization ability, the remaining 15 groups of data are normalized and simulated with the
established BP neural network mode. The simulation results are shown in table 2. Among them, (0, 0),
(1, 0) and (1, 1) represent the weak, moderate and strong governance intensities, respectively. The first
two represent equity capital governance intensities, and the last two represent human capital
governance intensities. Considering the existence of errors in simulation verification, this paper sets
the simulation results below 0.03 as 0 and above 0.97 as 1.
Tab 2. Comparison between simulation results and expected results of neural network model
Serial number
01

Simulation results

Expected results

（1.0000，0.0087，0.9727，0.0000）

（1，0，1，0）

02

（1.0000，1.0000，0.0006，0.0000）

（1，1，0，0）

03

（0.9960，0.0017，1.0000，0.9967）

（1，0，1，1）

04

（1.0000，0.0001，1.0000，0.0266）

（1，0，1，0）
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05

（0.1889，0.0000，1.0000，0.0044）

（0，0，1，0）

06

（1.0000，0.0000，1.0000，0.0079）

（1，0，1，0）

07

（0.9924，0.9999，0.0020，0.0000）

（1，1，0，0）

08

（0.9961，0.0001，1.0000，0.0023）

（1，0，1，0）

09

（1.0000，0.9999，0.0016，0.0000）

（1，1，0，0）

10

（1.0000，1.0000，1.0000，0.0085）

（1，1，1，0）

11
12

（1.0000，0.9911，0.0010，0.0000）

（1，1，0，0）

（1.0000，0.0000，0.9747，0.0000）

（1，0，1，0）

13

（0.9954，0.0001，1.0000，0.0018）

（1，0，1，0）

14

（1.0000，0.0012，1.0000，0.9971）

（1，0，1，1）

15

（1.0000，0.0028，1.0000，0.0050）

（1，0，1，0）

According to the simulation results, the simulation error is

, with an accuracy rate

of 93.3%, indicating that the model is reasonable and the identification accuracy is high, and thus, the
model can accurately identify private listed companies’ governance modes.
3.5. Random test and verification of BP neural network
The recognition effect of the BP neural network mode under random conditions is further tested,
and a 10-7-4 BP neural network mode is constructed. A total of 435 groups of samples are randomly
selected from 450 groups for learning and training. Among them, the neural network mode with 7
nodes in the hidden layer is randomly trained 105 times with the minimum global error of
, as shown in figure 5.
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Best Training Performance is 0.00011564 at epoch 105
0

Mean Squared Error (mse)

10

-1

10

-2

10

-3

10

-4

10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

105 Epochs

Fig 5. Random training results with hidden layer node number of 7
The remaining 15 groups of samples are used for the random simulation test of the model. The
random simulation results are shown in table 3.
Tab 3. Comparison of random simulation results with expected results of neural network model
Serial number
Random simulation results
Expected results
01
（0.9786，0.0004，0.9795，0.0003）
（1，0，1，0）
02

（1.0000，0.9996，0.0005，0.0000）

（1，1，0，0）

03

（0.9999，0.0000，1.0000，0.9879）

（1，0，1，1）

04

（1.0000，0.0192，1.0000，0.0001）

（1，0，1，0）

05

（0.0342，0.0000，1.0000，0.0001）

（0，0，1，0）

06

（0.9861，0.0000，1.0000，0.0000）

（1，0，1，0）

07

（1.0000，0.0000，1.0000，0.9999）

（1，0，1，1）

08

（1.0000，0.0000，0.9999，0.0000）

（1，0，1，0）

09

（0.9816，0.0000，1.0000，0.0000）

（1，0，1，0）

10

（0.9924，0.0000，0.0259，0.0000）

（1，0，0，0）

11

（0.0000，0.0000，1.0000，0.0021）

（0，0，1，0）
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12

（0.9995，0.0000，1.0000，0.0870）

（1，0，1，0）

13

（0.9982，0.0000，1.0000，0.9984）

（1，0，1，1）

14

（0.0063，0.0000，1.0000，1.0000）

（0，0，1，1）

15

（0.9461，0.0000，1.0000，0.0050）

（1，0，1，0）

According to the random simulation results, the random simulation error is

, with

an accuracy rate of 80%. This shows that the model can identify the governance mode of private listed
companies accurately and has high practical value under the random state.
The key purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical basis for private enterprises to choose
the optimal governance mode. After effectively identifying the governance mode of private listed
companies, how can the best governance mode be chosen? This article further proposes the solution as
follows.
Research results on private enterprises show that the level of management efficiency directly
reflects the quality of the governance mode. Therefore, the optimal governance mode should be based
on the management efficiency. Management efficiency is mainly reflected in the profitability, solvency
and operation ability of a company. Therefore, this paper further compares the management efficiency
of various governance modes in private enterprises of different scales to arrive at the optimal
governance mode of private enterprises to provide a theoretical basis for the selection of the optimal
governance mode of private enterprises.
4. Selection of private listed companies’ governance mode
On the basis of management pattern recognition of private listed companies by using the BP
neural network mode, this paper analyses the evolution of private listed companies’ governance modes,
classifies various governance modes at different scales, comparatively analyses the governance
efficiency of various governance modes at different scales and provides the basis for private listed
companies’ governance mode choices.
4.1. Evolution of private listed companies’ governance model
To understand the evolution trend of private listed companies’ governance mode at different
scales, this paper processes three groups of sample data in categories of small, medium and large. The
mean score of the equity capital governance index is used to represent the equity capital governance
intensity, denoted
governance

index

, and the mean score of the human capital
represents

the

human

capital

governance

intensity,

denoted

. Additionally, the intensity of equity capital management and human

capital management should be standardized, and the formula is

, where i =1, 2, t=1,
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2,3…450,

represents the initial value of the equity capital governance intensity (or human capital

governance intensity) of the t sample in group i,

represents the mean of the sample in group i,

represents the standard deviation of the sample in group i, and

represents the

normalized value of the t sample in group i.
MATLAB 2014a programming is used to draw a scatter diagram with human capital governance
intensity as the horizontal coordinate and equity capital governance intensity as the vertical coordinate,
and a Gaussian kernel function is used for fitting to obtain the evolution trend of private listed
companies’ governance modes at different scales (figure 6). As shown in figure 6, the evolution trend
of private listed companies’ governance mode is roughly ‘L’, showing the evolution law of ‘strong
equity and weak manpower→moderate equity and moderate manpower→weak equity and moderate
manpower’.
3
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Fig 6. Evolution trend of private listed companies’ governance mode in the growth period
(1) Analysis of the ‘strong equity and weak manpower’ governance mode in small private listed
companies. In small private listed companies, the actual controllers (or families) have a strong desire
to control enterprises and are reluctant to transfer or dilute their ownership and control rights. In the
small private listed companies, the private listed companies’ structure is relatively simple, and the
knowledge of by the actual controller (or family) can adapt to enterprise development, while the
importance of professional entrepreneurs is not obvious. Therefore, most of the small private listed
companies have strong equity capital governance. The concentration of power in the actual controller
(or family) and exploration of actual controller (or family) benefit maximization are the main features
of private listed companies. The actual controller (or family) has absolute authority over the
decision-making of enterprises and plays a crucial role in the development of small private listed
companies. The governance mode is dominated by equity capital governance, while human capital
governance is relatively weak.
(2) Analysis of the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ governance mode in the medium
private listed companies. The mode of equity capital leading governance is difficult to adapt to the
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needs of private listed companies. Additionally, with the ageing of the knowledge structure of the
actual controller (or family) and the limitation of management ability, the actual controller (or family)
decision-making mode with absolute authority hinders innovation and development, and professional
entrepreneurs become the key factors for further development and enterprise expansion. In the
medium private listed companies, private listed companies begin to attach importance to the status of
professional entrepreneurs, and professional entrepreneurs gradually become actual managers of
enterprises. The importance of human capital governance becomes increasingly prominent, leading to
weakening of equity capital governance intensity and improvement in human capital governance
intensity. Additionally, because the human capital market in our country is not mature, the trust
mechanism between the actual controller (or family) and professional entrepreneurs has not been fully
established, the equity capital management intensity of medium private listed companies is decreased,
while the human capital management intensity is increased. The management pattern of middle equity
and middle manpower occupies the highest proportion, but compared to the equity capital
management intensity, human capital management intensity is still in a vulnerable position.
(3) Analysis of the ‘weak equity and moderate manpower’ governance mode in large private
listed companies. These private listed companies gradually shift from focusing on high quantity
development to high quality development; it becomes more necessary to strengthen professional
management, and the important role of professional entrepreneurs becomes more prominent. In the
large private listed companies, each rule and regulation within the enterprise is more complete,
professional entrepreneurs’ behaviour is more open and transparent, and the supervision of
professional entrepreneurs’ behaviour constraint mechanism and incentive mechanism is more robust.
The trust mechanism between actual controllers (or family) and professional entrepreneurs has
gradually been established. More authority and equity is transferred from the actual controller (or
family) to the professional entrepreneur, further improving professional entrepreneurs’ status and
further strengthening human capital management intensity in the process, which further weakens
equity capital governance intensity. However, even if human capital governance intensity is greatly
improved compared with the small and medium categories, to prevent opportunistic behaviour in
professional entrepreneurs due to excessive power, which damages the interests of enterprises, the
actual controllers (or families) check and balance professional entrepreneurs’ power. Therefore, the
human capital governance intensity is still controlled within the moderate intensity in the large private
listed companies.
To support the above conclusions, further classification analysis on various kinds of governance
patterns of private listed firms at different scales should be conducted. According to the classification
standard, 450 samples are divided into three groups according to the categories of small, medium and
large private listed companies, and the proportions of all kinds of governance modes in each group is
determined, as shown in table 4, table 5 and table 6.
Tab 4. Proportion of private listed companies’ various governance modes in the early growth period
Governance pattern type
Strong equity and strong manpower
Strong equity and medium manpower
Strong equity and weak manpower
Medium equity and strong manpower
Medium equity and medium manpower

Proportion
4%
4%
32%
8%
20%
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Medium equity and weak manpower
Weak equity and strong manpower
Weak equity and medium manpower
Weak equity and weak manpower

16%
4%
8%
4%

Tab 5. The proportion of private enterprises’ various governance modes in the middle growth period
Governance pattern type
Strong equity and medium manpower
Strong equity and weak manpower
Medium equity and strong manpower
Medium equity and medium manpower
Medium equity and weak manpower
Weak equity and medium manpower

Proportion
4%
16%
8%
44%
20%
8%

Tab 6. The proportion of private listed companies’ various governance modes in the later growth
period
Governance pattern type
Strong equity and weak manpower
Medium equity and strong manpower
Medium equity and medium manpower
Medium equity and weak manpower
Weak equity and strong manpower
Weak equity and medium manpower

Proportion
4%
20%
28%
4%
4%
40%

Table 4, table 5 and table 6 show that the ‘strong equity and weak manpower’ governance mode
accounts for the highest proportion of small private listed companies, the ‘moderate equity and
moderate manpower’ governance mode accounts for the highest proportion of medium private listed
companies, and the ‘weak equity and middle manpower’ governance mode accounts for the highest
proportion of large private listed companies, which verifies the scientific accuracy of the above
conclusions.
4.2. Comparison of private listed companies’ governance efficiency
By analysing the evolution of private listed companies’ governance modes at different scales and
classifying various governance modes at small, medium and large scales, we obtain the evolution trend
of governance modes at different scales but not the effective governance mode. To obtain the most
effective governance mode, the evaluation index system of governance efficiency is further
constructed, as shown in table 7.
Tab 7. Evaluation index system of private listed companies’ governance efficiency
1.Operating income
2.Rate of return on net profit
Enterprise profitability
Evaluation index of private
3.Ratio of earnings per share to equity
indicators
listed companies’
per share
governance efficiency
4.Net
profit
after
deducting
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non-recurring gains and losses
5.Ratio of current liabilities to total
assets
6.Ratio of current assets to total assets

Corporate solvency
Indicators
Enterprise operation ability
index
The efficiency of the private listed company governance evaluation index is divided into three
first-level indicators of corporate profitability: the enterprise debt paying ability index and the
enterprise capacity index. Profitability indicators reflect enterprises’ profit from the perspective of
revenue and profit ability size, including four secondary indexes. The higher the operating income, the
rate of return on net profit, the ratio of earnings per share to net assets per share and net profit after
deducting non-recurring gains and losses are, the stronger the enterprise’s profit ability and the better
the governance efficiency. The enterprise solvency indicators from the angle of current liabilities
reflect the size of an enterprise’s solvency, including a secondary index. The higher the current liability
to total asset ratio and the enterprise’s solvency are, the better the governance efficiency is. From the
perspective of current assets, the index of the enterprise operating ability reflects the strength of the
enterprise operating ability, including a secondary index. The higher the ratio of current assets to total
assets is, the stronger the enterprise operation ability and the better the governance efficiency.
The same MATLAB 2014a program is used to assign values to each index of samples. The sum
of each index score of the sample indicates the governance efficiency of the sample.
The samples are divided into three groups according to the small, medium and large categories.
Each set of the same governance patterns is divided into a group, denoted

, representing the

governance efficiency of the t sample of the i governance mode in the n (small, medium, large)
enterprise. Then, the average governance efficiency of governance mode i in enterprise n is obtained,
and the average governance efficiency is 21. The formula is as follows:

Thus, the columnar relationship diagram of governance efficiency

and governance mode

type i of various private listed companies at different scales is established, as shown in table 8, table 9
and table 10.
Tab 8. Relationship chart of governance mode and governance efficiency of private listed companies
at the early stage of growth
Governance mode
Strong equity and strong manpower
Strong equity and medium manpower
Strong equity and weak manpower
Medium equity and strong manpower
Medium equity and medium manpower
Medium equity and weak manpower
Weak equity and strong manpower

Governance efficiency
10
10
11.4
9
13
10.5
8
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Weak equity and medium manpower
Weak equity and weak manpower

10
10

In table 8, among all kinds of private listed companies’ governance modes at the small level, the
governance efficiency of the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ governance mode is the
highest. Therefore, it can be inferred that the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ governance
mode is the most effective governance mode for small private listed companies.
Tab 9. Relationship chart of governance mode and governance efficiency of private listed companies
at the middle stage of growth
Governance mode
Strong equity and medium manpower
Strong equity and weak manpower
Medium equity and strong manpower
Medium equity and medium manpower
Medium equity and weak manpower
Weak equity and medium manpower

Governance efficiency
10
9.75
10
12
9.75
10

In table 9, among all kinds of governance modes of private listed companies in the medium
category, the governance efficiency of the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ governance
mode is the highest. Therefore, it can be inferred that the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’
governance mode is the most effective governance mode for medium private listed companies.
Tab 10. Relationship chart of governance mode and governance efficiency of private listed companies
at the later stage of growth
Governance mode
Strong equity and weak manpower
Medium equity and strong manpower
Medium equity and medium manpower
Medium equity and weak manpower
Weak equity and strong manpower
Weak equity and medium manpower

Governance efficiency
11
9.8
13
9
9
10.3

In table 10, among all kinds of governance modes of private listed companies in the large
category, the governance efficiency of the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ governance
mode is the highest. Therefore, it can be inferred that the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’
governance mode is the most effective governance mode for large private listed companies.
In summary, the ‘moderate equity and moderate manpower’ governance mode is the most
effective governance mode for private listed companies. This indicates that to achieve optimal
governance efficiency, private listed companies must implement collaborative governance of human
capital and equity capital. Regardless of whether the equity capital governance intensity is too high or
too low or the governance intensity of human capital is too high or too low, the optimal governance
efficiency of private listed companies cannot be achieved. Excessive governance intensity of equity
capital leads to ‘one dominant share’ and ‘insider control’. The actual controller (or family) is
excessively centralized, tends to be opinionated when making business decisions and cannot
International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-8, Iss-3
65

brainstorm. Additionally, an excessive monopoly of the actual controller (or family) reduces the
working enthusiasm of professional entrepreneurs, increases the transaction cost within the enterprise,
and reduces the efficiency of enterprise governance. If the human capital governance intensity is too
high, professional entrepreneurs have too much power, and opportunism easily forms. To pursue
higher personal interests, professional entrepreneurs damage the interests of enterprises, leading to the
decline of enterprise governance efficiency. The collaborative governance of human capital and equity
capital can effectively integrate the advantages of the two and prevent the actual controller (or family)
or professional entrepreneur from reducing the efficiency of corporate governance. Equity
diversification and professional management make the corporate governance structure more optimized,
which is conducive to improving corporate governance efficiency.
5. Conclusions and prospects
The BP neural network mode is established for China’s private listed company governance
pattern identification by using the multi-layer forward feedback algorithm of error back propagation.
This paper analyses the evolution of the governance mode at different scales, classifies various
governance modes, and compares its efficiency. The following conclusions can be obtained.
First, this paper divided the governance modes of private listed companies into 9 categories from
the two dimensions of equity capital and human capital. Taking the governance index as the input
vector and the governance mode as the output vector, the BP neural network mode is built to
accurately identify all kinds of different scales of private listed company governance mode.
Second, through the analysis of the evolution of private listed companies’ governance mode and
the classification analysis of various governance modes in the small, medium and large categories, the
evolution trend of private listed companies’ governance mode is roughly ‘L’. Private listed companies
in the small, medium and large categories choose ‘strong equity and weak manpower’, ‘moderate
equity and moderate manpower’ and ‘weak equity and moderate manpower’ governance modes,
respectively.
Third, this paper comparatively analyses the governance efficiency of private listed company
governance modes at different scales. The results show that ‘moderate equity and moderate
manpower’ is the most effective governance mode, indicating that it is not desirable for China’s
private listed companies to emphasize the dominant governance of equity capital or human capital. It
is the best choice to use the cooperative governance mode of human capital and equity capital.
This paper has carried out exploratory research on private listed company governance from the
aspects of human capital and equity capital synergy that enriches the existing research achievements of
private listed company governance, broadens the thinking of follow-up researchers and innovatively
constructs a BP neural network mode of private listed company governance (in figure 2) and the
governance grid mode (in figure 3). The BP neural network mode is used to study the private listed
company governance mode, which enriches the research methods. Additionally, China’s private
enterprise is rooted in traditional culture. Regarding the choice of governance mode, the influence of
traditional Chinese Confucian culture is very high. The professional manager market is not mature at
the present stage in China, the financial market order is imperfect, and the trust mechanism between
entrepreneurs and professional entrepreneurs is not fully established, leading to the construction of a
feasible cooperative governance mode of equity capital and human capital being hindered. I will
continue to explore this concept, broaden the research objects and conduct research on small, medium
and micro-sized enterprises, family enterprises, etc., in the hopes of exploring the best governance
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mode for all kinds of private enterprises.
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